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EQUAL TIME EQUALS UNEQUAL TREATMENT
TO NEWSCASTER CANDIDATES
A common fear among political candidates is the exposure of their
opponents. A candidate will always try to remain one step ahead of his
opponent by attending an extra benefit, headlining in a newspaper or
magazine, or appearing on a media broadcast. However, a candidate's
overexposure on media broadcasts is limited because a candidate's oppo-
nents must receive equal media time. But, should a newscaster candi-
date's opponents receive time equal to the news reports if the newscaster
candidate is merely doing his job?
The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. section 315(a)' ("sec-
tion 315(a)"), requires broadcasters to provide equal opportunity, more
commonly known as equal time,2 to opponents of all candidates who
"use" their station. Therefore, if a political candidate makes an appear-
ance on television, the broadcaster must afford the candidate's opponents
equal air time to make their own appearances. The statute, however,
provides exemptions in which the broadcast station is not required to
provide equal time to a candidate's opponents. Thus, a broadcaster must
provide equal time to a candidate's opponents if the candidate "uses" the
broadcasting facilities and his appearance does not fall within the
exemptions.
1. The Communications Act of 1934, § 315(a) states:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for
any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to
all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station: Pro-
vided, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broad-
cast under the provisions of this section. No obligation is imposed under this
subsection upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate.
Appearance by a legally qualified candidate on any-
(1) bona fide newscast,
(2) bona fide news interview,
(3) bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the candidate is incidental
to the presentation of the subject or subjects covered by the news documentary), or
(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but not limited to
political conventions and activities incidental thereto), shall not be deemed to be use
of a broadcasting station within the meaning of this subsection. Nothing in the fore-
going sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in connection with the
presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot
coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them under this chapter
to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discus-
sion of conflicting views on issues of public importance.
The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982).
2. Section 315(a) uses the term "equal opportunity," however, the more popular term is
"equal time." Both terms will be used interchangeably throughout this note.
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The Federal Communications Commission ("Commission"), in In
re William H. Branch,3 ruled that news reporting by a newscaster candi-
date constitutes a "use" of the broadcast facilities within the meaning of
section 315(a), and that newscaster candidates do not come within the
exemptions provided by the statute.4 Thus, broadcasters must provide
media time to every opponent of a newscaster candidate equivalent to the
amount of time the newscaster spends reporting the news. Newscaster
candidate William Branch ("Branch") challenged this ruling since the
burden of providing equal time to his opponents forced him to abandon
his campaign in order to avoid taking a leave of absence from work.5
Branch was a news reporter who covered general assignments for
Sacramento television station KOVR, in which he appeared on-the-air an
average of three minutes per day.6 In 1984, Branch decided to seek elec-
tion to the Town Council of Loomis, California.7 Because he was aware
that federal law imposed certain equal time requirements on broadcast-
ers, he consulted with the station management before commencing his
campaign. KOVR informed Branch of its unwillingness to provide the
thirty-three hours of response time to his opponents necessary to comply
with the statute.' Recognizing its duty to provide equal time to oppo-
nents of political candidates who appeared on the air, KOVR assumed
the same requirement applied to newscaster candidates. Consequently,
the station management told Branch that if he wished to maintain his
candidacy, he must take an unpaid leave of absence from work during
the campaign period. 9 Furthermore, KOVR refused to guarantee
Branch that his position would be available after the election.1°
Branch immediately sought a judicial and administrative review of
his rights, claiming that section 315(a) unduly burdened his ability to run
for political office."1 However, he was unable to get a ruling prior to the
1984 election. Put to a choice, Branch chose to drop out of the election
3. 101 F.C.C.2d 901 (1985).
4. Id. at 902-04, 906. See Branch v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 824 F.2d 37
(D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1220 (1988).
5. Branch, 824 F.2d at 39.
6. Id. at 39.
7. Branch lived in Loomis, California, a small community (approximately 4,000 people)
near Sacramento. Late in 1982, Branch participated in a successful effort to incorporate Loo-
mis as a town. Id. at 39.
8. Id. The 33 hours of response time was calculated by "multiplying 11 (the number of
Branch's opponents) times 60 days (the approximate number of days in the campaign) times
three minutes per day (the approximate number of minutes per day that Branch is on the air)."
Id. at 39 n. I.
9. Branch, 824 F.2d at 39.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 47-48.
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instead of taking an unpaid leave of absence.' 2 Upon the termination of
his candidacy, Branch sought a declaratory ruling from the Commission
which would enable him to run for political office in the future without
jeopardizing his employment.'
3
Specifically, Branch asked the Commission to rule on two issues: (1)
whether section 315(a) required broadcast stations to provide equal time
to the opponents of newscaster candidates; and (2) whether section
315(a) was constitutional as applied.' 4 The Commission held that broad-
cast stations must provide equal time to a newscaster candidate's oppo-
nents.15 As to the second issue, the Commission deferred to Congress'
determination in enacting section 315(a), claiming that decisions regard-
ing the constitutionality of a statute were beyond its jurisdiction.' 6
Branch appealed in Branch v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion, 17 arguing that his appearances were exempt under the first exemp-
tion provided in the statute.' 8 Branch asserted that a newscaster
candidate's appearance while reporting the news is on a bona fide news-
cast and therefore exempt from the "equal time" requirement.' 9 The
court rejected this argument, stating that its simplicity was misleading.
20
Moreover, the court upheld the Commission's ruling on the scope
and applicability of the "equal time" requirement of section 315(a). Spe-
cifically, the court agreed with the Commission's determination that the
"equal time" provision in section 315(a) applied to newscasters, and that
the reporting done by newscasters did not come within any of the exemp-
tions provided in the statute. Thus, broadcasters are required to provide
equal time to opponents of newscaster candidates.
In reaching its conclusion, the Branch court first looked to the legis-
lative history creating the exemptions to section 315(a). According to
the Branch court, Congress amended section 315(a) in 1959 to overrule
12. Id. at 39.
13. Id.
14. Branch, 824 F.2d at 39. The court also ruled on the government's contention that
Branch lacked standing to bring this suit. The court held that Branch did have standing to
bring this case. Id. at 40.
15. Id. at 39. "[T]he Commission concluded that news-caster candidates do not come
within any special exemption from a station's statutory obligation to provide equal time to
other candidates." Id. at 39 (citing In re William H. Branch, 101 F.C.C.2d at 902-04, 906).
16. Branch, 824 F.2d at 39-40.
17. 824 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1220 (1988).
18. Id. at 41. For the language of § 315(a)(1) see supra note 1.
19. Branch, 824 F.2d at 41.
20. Id. at 42.
1989)
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
the holding in In re Telegram to CBS, Inc.2 1 ("Lar Daly"). Lar Daly
eliminated the long standing exemption for a candidate's appearance on
"a routine news broadcast" from the "equal time" requirement.22
According to the Branch court, Congress overturned the Lar Daly
decision because it did not want to impose the "equal time" requirement
on broadcast stations that displayed news coverage of a candidate.23
Congress believed that imposing such a burden would deter the broad-
cast media from providing the public with full coverage of political news
events as well as many other news events. 24 The Branch court noted that
the creation of the exemptions in the 1959 amendment to section 315(a)
was Congress' attempt to protect broadcaster freedom and discretion in
determining which newsworthy events to present to the public. 25 How-
ever, the Branch court found that Congress' purpose, greater broadcast
freedom, was attainable without excluding newscaster candidates from
the "equal time" requirement.
In the second issue raised before the court, Branch asserted that the
Commission "acted arbitrarily and capriciously" by refusing to review
the constitutionality of section 315.26 The Commission refused to rule on
the statute's constitutionality, claiming that such decisions were beyond
the jurisdiction of administrative agencies.27 Accepting the statute as
constitutional, the Commission deferred to Congress' determination in
enacting section 315 and acknowledged the governmental interest in as-
suring the equitable treatment of all candidates. 28 Agreeing with the
Commission, the court rejected Branch's argument, stating that the
Commission did not have jurisdiction to declare statutes
unconstitutional.29
The court, however, addressed Branch's substantive challenges to
the constitutionality of section 315(a). Branch's first objection was that
the statute extinguished his right to seek political office. Branch asserted
that the statute imposed an undue burden on his ability to run for office
because he was unable to continue his regular employment during the
campaign period.30 The court rejected this argument by balancing the
21. 18 P & F Radio Reg. 238, reconsideration denied, 26 F.C.C. 715, 18 P & F Radio Reg.
701 (1959).
22. Branch, 824 F.2d at 43-44.
23. Id. at 45.
24. Id. at 44.
25, Id.
26, Id. at 47.
27. In re William H. Branch, 101 F.C.C.2d at 904 n.4.
28. Id. at 904.
29, Branch, 824 F.2d at 47.
30. Id. at 48.
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burden placed on Branch against the important and legitimate objectives
in preventing the unequal use of the broadcast media."'
Next, Branch asserted that section 315(a) was unconstitutional be-
cause the "equal time" provision violated the first amendment. Branch
claimed that the "equal time" requirement imposed an unconstitutional
penalty on broadcasters by compelling them to broadcast material
against their will.32 Moreover, Branch argued that the "equal time" pro-
vision was identical in impact to the right-of-reply statute found in
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.33 In Tornillo, a right-of-reply
statute34 was struck down because it imposed an unconstitutional penalty
on publishers by compelling them to publish material against their will.
The Branch court, however, rejected Branch's first amendment chal-
lenge, holding that Branch's reliance on Tornillo was misplaced. 35 The
court reasoned that Branch's situation involved the broadcast media as
opposed to the print media, and that the first amendment protections
applied more forcefully to the print media.36 Furthermore, the Branch
court held that the Supreme Court decision in Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. Federal Communications Commission 3' directly foreclosed Branch's
claim.
In Red Lion, the Supreme Court upheld the government's authority
under the fairness doctrine 31 which requires broadcast stations to give
fair coverage to each side of a public issue.39 The Court focused on the
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which the right of the viewers and
listeners was paramount to the right of the broadcasters.' In the course
of its opinion, the Court held that the "equal time" requirement of sec-
tion 315(a) and the fairness doctrine involved the same governmental
31. Id. at 48-49.
32. Id. at 49.
33. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
34. FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (1973) (repealed 1975). This right of reply statute provided "that
if a candidate for nomination or election is assailed regarding his personal character or official
record by any newspaper, the candidate has the right to demand the newspaper print, free of
cost to the candidate, any reply the candidate may make to the newspaper's charges." Tornillo,
418 U.S. at 244.
35. Branch, 824 F.2d at 49.
36. Id.
37. 395 U.S. 367 (1967).
38. The fairness doctrine should not be confused with the equal opportunity doctrine. Un-
like the equal opportunity doctrine, the fairness doctrine does not create any rights for a par-
ticular individual, rather it requires that each side of the public issue be given fair coverage.
Annotation, Political Candidate's Right to Equal Broadcast Time Under 47 U.S. CS. § 315, 35
A.L.R. FED. 856, 862-63 (1977) [hereinafter Equal Broadcast Time].
39. Branch, 824 F.2d at 49.
40. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
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power.4' Namely, the Court felt that the government had the power to
regulate a scarce resource (broadcast air waves) which it had denied
others the right to use.
Branch's final constitutional challenge to section 315(a) was that the
Commission's ruling limited a broadcast station's discretion in selecting
its newscasters. The court rejected this argument, stating that the bur-
dens placed on the broadcast station in choosing its newscasters "is a
much less significant burden than rules requiring the transmission of re-
plies to personal attacks and political editorials, which were upheld in
Red Lion. "
42
In his concurrence, Judge Starr stated that Branch's three-minute
news segments were "bona fide newscasts" and, therefore, statutorily ex-
empt from the "equal time" requirement. Judge Starr agreed with
Branch's straightforward reading of the statute. He claimed that "a
more natural statutory interpretation would exempt newscast reporters
who are just doing their jobs from the 'equal opportunities' requirement
of section 315(a)."'4 3 However, in light of the two permissible readings of
the statute, Judge Starr concurred with the majority because he believed
that Congress' intent was ambiguous. He recognized that where Con-
gress' intent was unclear, he was bound to defer to the Commission's
reasonable interpretation of the statute.44
PURPOSE AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF SECTION 315(a)
Section 315(a) was enacted to encourage unrestricted discussion of
political issues and to regulate the use of publicly licensed broadcasting
facilities by political candidates.45 Specifically, the purpose of section
315(a) is to ensure that broadcasters provide equal treatment to political
candidates.46 In order to keep the public informed, the public must be
exposed to all sides of an issue and be free to come to its own conclu-
sions. To keep the public informed and ensure equal treatment among
candidates, the statute requires that a station which permits a candidate
to "use" its facilities must afford opposing candidates the same
41. Branch, 824 F.2d at 49.
42. Id. at 50.
43. Id. at 52.
44. Id. (construing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984)).
45. Paulsen v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 491 F.2d 887, 889 (1974); Note, The
Equal Opportunity Doctrine: The Broadcast Executive Who Campaigns For Political Office
Makes His Own Strange Bedfellow, 6 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT. L.J. 113 (1987).
46. Paulsen, 491 F.2d at 889 (citing McCarthy v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 390




Section 315(a), as originally enacted and interpreted,4" imposed an
absolute duty on broadcasters to provide equal treatment to competing
political candidates. The Radio Act of 1927 required that "[i]f any licen-
see shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any
public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportu-
nities to all other such candidates for the office in the use of such broad-
casting station .. .. 9 This language served as Congress' sole statement
of the equal opportunity rule for thirty-two years. 50 During that period,
the Commission interpreted the equal opportunity rule as requiring
broadcasters to provide equal time to candidates whose opponents ap-
peared on the air, unless the candidate appeared on a "routine news
broadcast."'" The Commission reasoned that "such an appearance did
not constitute a 'use' of the broadcast facility insofar as the candidate did
not directly or indirectly initiate the filming or presentation of the
event. 52
In 1959, the Commission in In re Telegram to CBS, Inc. 3 ("Lar
Daly") radically departed from its prior interpretation of section 315(a).
The Commission applied the "equal time" rule to the appearance of a
candidate on a regularly scheduled newscast. 54 In that case, Lar Daly, a
candidate for Mayor of Chicago, filed a complaint regarding his oppo-
nent's television appearances on newscasts. Among other things, Lar
Daly requested equal air time for the broadcaster's coverage of his oppo-
nent's interviews. More specifically, he sought equal time for the broad-
cast of the incumbent Mayor, an opponent, greeting the Argentinean
President at the airport. 5
In response to Lar Daly's complaint, the Commission granted him
equal time. The Commission held that a candidate's appearance on a
47. See supra note 1 for text of § 315(a).
48. Radio Act of 1927, § 18, 44 Stat. 1170.
49. See supra note 1 for the first two sentences of § 315(a), which were a re-enactment of
the Radio Act of 1927. Equal Broadcast Time, 35 A.L.R. FED. at 860 n.3.
50. Branch, 824 F.2d at 42.
51. In re Allen H. Blondy, 40 F.C.C. 284, 285 (1957).
52. Chisholm v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 538 F.2d 349, 351-52 (D.C. Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976). This interpretation became embodied in the Commis-
sion's official release of Oct. 6, 1958, entitled "Use of Broadcast Facilities by Candidates for
Public Office." Id. at 352 (citing Public Notice F.C.C. 58-936. 111-12; 105 CONG. REC. 14459
(1959)).
53. 18 P & F Radio Reg. 238 (1959), reconsideration denied, 26 F.C.C. 715, 18 P & F
Radio Reg. 701 (1959).
54. In re CBS, Inc., 26 F.C.C. at 717; see also Chisholm, 538 F.2d at 352.
55. In re CBS, Inc., 26 F.C.C. at 717.
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newscast constituted a "use" of the broadcasting station.56 This decision
was severely criticized because it upset the balance between a broad defi-
nition of the term "use" and a broadcast station's freedom to determine
which events merit news coverage.5 The Commission recognized the
severe limitation its decision had on the coverage of campaign affairs,
however, the Commission believed that the result was necessary to com-
ply with the unconditional language of section 315(a). 8
The Lar Daly case created a national furor. Many people feared
that the Commission's strict application of the equal opportunities provi-
sion "would tend to dry up meaningful radio and television coverage of
political campaigns."59 This fear prompted Congress to reassess the stat-
ute in light of the Commission's decision.' Congress believed that the
concept of absolute equality among competing political candidates,
which was the result in Lar Daly, must give way to two other "worthy
and desirable" objectives: "First, the right of the public to be informed
through broadcasts of the political events; and second, the discretion of
the broadcaster to be selective with respect to the broadcasting of such
events."
6 1
Pursuant to these objectives, Congress amended section 315(a) in
1959 to provide for certain appearances by political candidates which
would not require the station to provide equal time to opponents. The
amendment added the following list of exemptions:
(1) bona fide newscast,
(2) bona fide news interview,
(3) bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of candi-
date is incidental to the presentation of the subject or sub-
jects covered by the news documentary), or
(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including
but not limited to political conventions and activities inci-
dental thereto).62
In this amendment, Congress included the traditional exemption to
the "equal time" requirement, appearance on a routine news broadcast,
56. See Chisholm, 538 F.2d at 352.
57. Branch, 824 F.2d at 42.
58. In re CBS, Inc., 26 F.C.C. at 743.
59. Chisholm, 538 F.2d at 352 (quoting S. REP. No. 562, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1959),
reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2564, 2572).
60. Paulsen, 491 F.2d at 890.
61. Chisholm, 538 F.2d at 352 (quoting Hearings on Political Broadcasts-Equal Time
Before the Subcommittee on Communications and Power of the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959) (comment of Chairman Harris)).
62. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1)-(4) (1982).
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which was eliminated by the Lar Daly decision. Congress' intent in en-
acting the 1959 amendment was to return to the status quo prior to the
Lar Daly decision.63 Congress did not want a candidate's appearance on
a "routine newscast" to trigger the equal time requirement." In addi-
tion, Congress codified three exemptions which the Commission always
thought were excluded from the "equal time" requirement.65
BRANCH'S APPEARANCES Do NOT FALL WITHIN SECTION 315(a)
Under a straightforward reading of section 315(a), Branch's appear-
ances were not "uses" of the broadcast station. The statute provides that
if a licensee permits a candidate to "use" the broadcast facilities, the li-
censee is required to provide equal time to the candidate's opponents.
66
However, the statute does not define "use." Instead, the Commission
and the courts seem to presume that any appearance by a political candi-
date is a "use," and the only way for the candidate to rebut this presump-
tion is if the appearance of the candidate falls within one of the
exemptions.67
The plain language of the statute, however, suggests an alternative
interpretation which requires a two-step approach. First, rather than
presume an appearance is a "use" of a broadcast facility, the court
should determine whether the candidate's appearance is actually a "use"
under the common definition of the word. If the appearance is not a
"use," the candidate should not be subject to the "equal time" require-
ment of section 315(a). On the other hand, if the appearance is a "use,"
the court should determine whether the appearance falls within any of
the statute's exemptions.
In determining whether the appearance is actually a "use," the court
should focus on the language of the statute. Specifically, the first sen-
tence states that broadcasters should provide equal time to a candidate's
opponents when the candidate is "permitted" to "use" the broadcast fa-
cilities. 68 As the concurrence in Branch demonstrates, when a news-
caster presents the news, he does not "use" or is not "permitted" to use
the broadcast station in the ordinary sense of those words.69 "Employers
63. Branch, 824 F.2d at 45.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 43 (citing 105 CONG. REc. 16229 (1959) (Rep. Harris)).
66. See supra note 1.
67. See generally Branch, 824 F.2d 37; Use of a Station by a News-caster Candidate
("WMAY"), 40 F.C.C. 433 (1965); Brigham v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 276 F.2d
828 (5th Cir. 1960).
68. See supra note 1.
69. Branch, 824 F.2d at 52.
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do not 'permit' their employees to 'use' broadcast facilities. Employees
are hired to do their jobs. Once on the payroll, they have to carry on
their duties; there is no 'permission' being granted in the everyday sense
of the word."7 Branch, as an employee, was therefore obligated to ap-
pear on the air. While reporting the news, he was not a political candi-
date who KOVR permitted to use its airwaves, rather, he was merely an
employee doing his job.
BRANCH'S APPEARANCES ARE EXEMPT UNDER THE BONA FIDE
NEWSCAST EXEMPTION
Even if Branch's appearances fall within the statute, he is still ex-
cluded from the "equal time" requirement because his appearances are
exempt under the bona fide newscast exemption.7 Courts have not
adopted the two-step analysis stated above, however, the determination
of whether an appearance constitutes a "use" was used in connection
with the application of the exemptions.72 If the courts refuse to approach
the statute in a straightforward two-step fashion, they should at least
acknowledge the plain meaning of the exemptions. The first exemption
provides that any appearance by a legally qualified candidate on any
bona fide newscast shall not be deemed a use of the broadcast station.73
Branch, in reporting his three-minute news segments unquestionably ap-
pears on a bona fide newscast. Therefore, under a natural reading of the
statute, Branch's appearances are exempt under the bona fide newscast
exemption of section 315(a).74
This common sense interpretation of section 315(a) was applied in
Brigham v. Federal Communications Commission.75 In Brigham, the
court upheld the Commission's determination that the "equal time" re-
quirement was inapplicable because a weathercaster's appearance fell
within the "bona fide newscast" exemption of section 315(a). 76 The Brig-
ham court stated:
There is not the slightest hint in the undisputed facts that this
weathercaster's appearance involved anything but a bona fide
effort to present the news.... [H]is employment is not some-
thing arising out of the election campaign but, rather, is a "reg-
70. Id
71. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1) (1982).
72. See generally Branch, 824 F.2d at 50 (Starr, J., concurring); Brigham, 276 F.2d 828.
73. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1) (1982).
74. Branch, 824 F.2d at 51.
75. 276 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1960). See infra text accompanying notes 89-93.
76. Brigham, 276 F.2d at 830. The Brigham court reiterated verbatim In re KWTX, 40
F.C.C. 304 (1960) in its opinion.
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ular job." Certainly the facts do not indicate any favoritism on
the part of the station licensee or intent to discriminate among
candidates."
The Brigham court held that a weathercaster reporting the weather
news does not "use" the station because he is just doing his job." Noth-
ing in the weathercaster's appearance involved more than a man present-
ing the weather news. Similarly, Branch should fall within the
exemption because his appearance was on a bona fide newscast. Branch's
appearance was no more than a bona fide effort to present the news.
Branch did not seek to use the station for political appearances or obtain
free exposure in furtherance of his campaign.
The majority in Branch, however, rejected the Brigham interpreta-
tion and focused on the Brigham court's failure to provide an analysis of
the statutory language or legislative history.79 The Branch court also
disagreed with the Brigham court's emphasis on favoritism by the sta-
tion. Moreover, the Branch majority stated that five years later the Com-
mission reversed its opinion8° and concluded that newscaster candidates
were not exempt under the statutory exemptions.8'
The Branch court erred in rejecting the Brigham interpretation just
because the Brigham court did not provide an in depth statutory analysis.
If the Branch court focused on the plain meaning of the statute, it would
have reached the same conclusion as Brigham. Because no ambiguity
exists on the face of the statute, the Branch court should rely on its plain
meaning.
The Branch Court Erred In The Interpretation Of Prior Case Law
The majority in Branch held that Use of a Station by Newscaster
Candidate82 ("WMA Y") overruled the Brigham decision and concluded
that newscaster candidates were not exempt from the "equal time" re-
quirement. 8a The Branch court specifically stated that: "[b]ased on its
more detailed consideration of the matter, the Commission reversed its
position and concluded that the 1959 amendments did not apply to ex-
empt newscaster candidates from the 'equal opportunities' rule."8 4
77. Branch, 824 F.2d at 51 (quoting Brigham, 276 F.2d at 830).
78. Brigham, 276 F.2d at 830.
79. Branch, 824 F.2d at 46.
80. Id. See WMA Y 40 F.C.C. 433.
81. Branch, 824 F.2d at 46.
82. 40 F.C.C. 433 (1965).
83. Branch, 824 F.2d at 46.
84. Id
1989)
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WMA Y did not overrule Brigham because the cases are factually
distinguishable. The critical consideration according to the Commission
in WMAY was the application of the 1959 amendment.85 Prior to the
1959 amendment to section 315(a), the Commission held that appear-
ances of a station announcer who later became a candidate were "uses"
under section 315(a).86 The Commission in WMA Y concluded that the
amendment did not determine whether appearances by newscaster candi-
dates were exempt.87 Since the Commission's report in WMA Y stated
that the case was limited strictly to the facts presented, 8 the Commis-
sion's conclusion only addresses a limited factual situation. Therefore,
the determination of whether equal time should be afforded to newscaster
candidates' opponents should focus on the particular factual situation.
In Brigham, the weatherman, referred to on the air as "TX
Weatherman,"89 delivered two regularly scheduled television newscasts
and two regularly scheduled radio newscasts.9' In addition, he did news-
casts on the television farm program and read warnings and weather bul-
letins during emergencies. 91 All of his newscasts dealt exclusively with
weather; he never made reference to political matters. After the
weatherman announced his candidacy for the state legislature, his oppo-
nent demanded equal time. The Commission determined that equal time
was not required because the weatherman's appearance was on a bona
fide newscast and therefore exempt.92 The Brigham court affirmed this
ruling, holding that the appearance involved only a bona fide presenta-
tion of the news. 93 Furthermore, the Brigham court found no station
favoritism and concluded that the weatherman's appearance was not
something arising out of an election campaign, but rather was a regular
job. In Brigham, as in WMA Y, the court limited the holding strictly to
the facts presented.
Contrary to Brigham, the Commission in WMA Y held that the ap-
pearance of a newscaster candidate would be considered a "use" of the
broadcast station.94 In WMA Y, the newscaster candidate, Mr. Brown,
85. WMA Y, 40 F.C.C. at 433.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 434.
88. Id.
89. He was employed to broadcast weather news on KWTX-TV and KWTX Radio. Brig-
ham, 276 F.2d at 828. The facts of Brigham are quoted directly from the Commission's report
in In re KWTX, 40 F.C.C. 304 (1960).
90. Brigham, 276 F.2d at 829.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 829.
93. Id. at 830.
94. WMAY, 40 F.C.C. at 434.
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was the station's news director, who prepared the news himself and
presented it on regularly scheduled programs. During his candidacy for
the school board, Mr. Brown discontinued broadcasting editorials and
was not identified by name on the air.9"
The main distinction between Brigham and WMA Y is each news-
caster candidate's responsibilities beyond reporting the news. The
weatherman in Brigham was strictly a weatherman, whereas, in WMA Y,
Mr. Brown was the station's news director as well as a reporter. The fact
that Mr. Brown was the station's news director is critical and is the rea-
son for the differing results in WMA Y and Brigham.
The Commission in WMA Y relied on the legislative history of sec-
tion 315(a) and indicated that the appearance of a candidate who partici-
pated in the "format and production" of the news would not be
exempt.96 However, the Commission made no reference to candidates
who did not participate in the "format and production." The Commis-
sion in WMA Y quoted the following passage from Congress:
It should be noted that the programs that are being exempted
in this legislation have one thing in common. They are gener-
ally news and information-type programs designed to dissemi-
nate information to the public and in almost every instance the
format and production of the program is under the control of
the broadcast station, or the network in the case of a network
program.
97
As the station news director and preparer of the news materials, Mr.
Brown had control over the "format and production" of the news. Obvi-
ously, he participated in decisions regarding what the station broadcast.
On the other hand, Brigham's result reflected the weatherman's nonpar-
ticipation in the "format and production" of the newscast. Therefore,
since the holdings are factually distinguishable, the facts of Branch must
be analogized to Brigham and WMA Y
The facts in Branch are more analogous to the facts in Brigham than
to the facts in WMA Y Branch's situation can clearly be distinguished
from WMA Y because Branch was merely a news reporter who reported
stories assigned to him. Branch was not a station news director as was
Mr. Brown, nor was he involved in the news production; he did not de-
termine which news stories the station reported.
On the other hand, Branch's responsibilities were similar to the "TX
95. Id. at 433.
96. Id. at 434.
97. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 562, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1959)).
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Weatherman's" responsibilities in Brigham. The weatherman was em-
ployed exclusively to broadcast weather news on television and radio and
he was responsible for the preparation and presentation of the weather-
casts.98 The weatherman had little discretion in what was broadcast.
Branch, much like "TX Weatherman," also had little discretion in what
was broadcast because he covered general assignments given to him by
the station.
The factor which distinguished WMAY from Brigham was the
newscaster's extensive involvement with the format and production of
the newscasts. When a newscaster candidate has control over the format
and production of the broadcast, a potential for abuse arises. He may
accept or reject news stories in order to enhance his campaign. On the
other hand, a newscaster candidate who merely reports the news has lit-
tle discretion and the potential for abuse is minimal. Since the facts in
WMA Y and Brigham are distinguishable, the Branch court should apply
Brigham as precedent because of the analogous facts. Therefore, the out-
come in Branch should have been the same as the outcome in Brigham,
in that Branch's opponents should have been denied equal time.
The Branch Court Erred In The Application Of
Section 315(a)'s Exemptions
The Branch court made a detailed examination of the exemptions
provided in section 315(a) by focusing on the legislative history. The
court concluded that the congressional intent in enacting the exemptions
was to protect the broadcaster's discretion to air newsworthy events. 99
The court found that Congress objected to the "equal time" requirement
placed on stations because the requirement deterred broadcast stations
from providing full coverage of political news events."o From the legis-
lative history the court derived the principle that Congress intended to
limit the exemptions only to candidate appearances which were
presented to the public as news."01 The Branch court stated that the
candidate's appearance must occur as part of the event covered in order
to be exempt. 10 2 According to the Branch majority, newscasters only
communicate the event; the communication is not a part of the event.
Therefore, the court concluded that reporting the news by a newscaster
98. Brigham, 276 F.2d at 828.
99. Branch, 824 F.2d at 51.
100. Id. at 44.
101. Id. at 51.
102. Id. at 45.
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was not exempt under section 315(a).10 3
The Branch court's analysis focuses on the language of the third and
fourth exemptions.'" The third exemption, the news documentary ex-
emption, is clarified in parentheses in the statute which applies "if the
appearance of the candidate is incidental to the presentation of the sub-
ject or subjects covered by the news documentary."' 0 5 The Branch court
concluded that the third exemption applies only when the candidate's
appearance relates to the subjects covered in the program. 'I
Similarly, the fourth exemption, on-the-spot coverage, is clarified as
applying only to bona fide news events which includes but is not limited
to political events.' 7 "Here again the focus is on a news event that is
being covered with the candidate's appearance expected to occur as part
of the event being covered."10 8
Oddly enough, the court did not analyze the first exemption, bona
fide newscast, which has no clarification, despite Branch's reliance on
this exemption. Rather, the court analyzed the third and fourth exemp-
tions which focus on the subjects and events of news coverage.' °9 From
its analysis, the court made a generalization that Congress intended all
the exemptions to apply only to candidates presented as the content of
the news. If Congress had wanted such a generalization, Congress would
have written a clarification to accompany the first exemption. Since no
clarification followed the first exemption, a natural reading of the statute
would exempt Branch because his appearance was on a bona fide
newscast.
A NEWSCASTER CANDIDATE Is FORCED To FOREGO
His LIVELIHOOD
A newscaster candidate should not have to forego his livelihood in
order to campaign for a political office. The court held that Branch's
inability to remain at his job during the campaign was not an undue
hardship, stating "nobody has ever thought that a candidate has a right
to run for office and at the same time to avoid all personal sacrifice." '" 0
Requiring a newscaster candidate to take an unpaid leave of absence if he
decides to run for a political office is not only a detriment to the news-
103. Id.
104. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)(3)-(4) (1982). See supra note 1.
105. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)(3) (1982).
106. Branch, 824 F.2d at 45.
107. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)(4) (1982). See supra note 1.
108. Branch, 824 F.2d at 45.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 48.
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caster candidate, but also a hindrance to the political process. By impos-
ing substantial economic disincentives to newscaster candidates who
wish to seek an elective office, the "equal time" requirement burdens en-
try into elective campaigns and concomitantly, limits the choice available
to voters.
The barrier of foregoing livelihood placed in the path of qualified
newscaster candidates is burdensome and beyond personal sacrifice. The
effect of being forced to make such a choice will deter newscaster candi-
dates from campaigning for political office. In addition, this barrier is
not applied equally to all candidates running for political office. A baker
is not required to forego his job at the bakery just because he decided to
run for the town council, whereas the same is not true in the case of a
newscaster.
The scenario in which a newscaster is running for a political office
and wants to continue working during his campaign is usually found
where a newscaster is running in a local election."' In order to run in
local elections, the candidate must be an outgoing and energetic person
and must be willing to work in a demanding public service job with little
glamour or pay. Therefore, not only the candidate, but also the commu-
nity is harmed when a newscaster campaigning in a political election is
discouraged from running for office.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Given that a newscaster may abuse his appearances on television,
this abuse may be minimized with certain restrictions. First, the news-
caster must be employed with the broadcast station for at least six
months prior to his announcement of candidacy to ensure that the candi-
date became a newscaster for reasons other than obtaining free exposure
for his campaign.
Second, the newscaster must maintain the same working hours that
he had prior to his candidacy. That is, a newscaster who worked forty
hours a week prior to his campaign must continue working such hours,
unless a reasonable agreement is made with the station. A candidate
should not be able to make broadcast appearances at his own conven-
ience. On the other hand, the same requirement should apply to prevent
excess exposure. The newscaster candidate should not increase his ap-
111. See generally Branch, 824 F.2d at 39; WMA Y, 40 F.C.C. at 433. A candidate running
in an election other than a local election will most likely be forced to spend the majority of his
time campaigning and would not be able to continue full time employment.
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pearances for the mere purpose of increasing his public exposure during
the campaign.
Third, the newscaster candidate's real name should not be used on
the air after he has announced his candidacy to help avoid name recogni-
tion. In Brigham, the court specifically noted that the weatherman was
known as "TX Weatherman" as opposed to being identified by his real
name. I 2 In addition, Mr. Brown in the WMA Y case was not identified
by his real name after he announced his candidacy."1 3 By avoiding name
recognition, or any reference to the campaign, viewers will be less likely
to associate the newscaster as a political candidate.
Fourth, the newscaster candidate should not be involved in the for-
mat or production of the newscasts. Furthermore, he should have little
or no discretion in what is broadcast.
Fifth, the newscaster candidate should not be allowed to report on
campaign or political issues. In addition, the newscaster candidate
should not present editorials in which his viewpoint is expressed. If the
newscaster candidate primarily reports on political issues or presents edi-
torials, he should not continue working while he is campaigning because
he is likely to influence the audience and is in essence "using" the broad-
cast station. On the other hand, if the newscaster candidate is doing his
job by reporting everyday events, such as the weather or sports, he is not
"using" the broadcast station nor is he abusing his position.
CONCLUSION
A newscaster candidate's appearance on the air should not automat-
ically trigger the "equal time" requirement. The courts should look to
the plain meaning of section 315(a) for its interpretation. The language
provides that a candidate's opponents receive equal time if the candidate
"uses" the station. Under a straightforward reading of the statute, a
newscaster candidate does not "use" a broadcast station unless he is in-
volved with the format and production of the newscast. Therefore, a
newscaster candidate's appearances should not fall within section 315(a).
Even if courts determine that newscaster candidates do fall within
section 315(a), a newscaster candidate's appearances are excempt from
the "equal time" requirement. A newscaster who merely reports the
news is on a routine newscast is exempt under the plain meaning of the
bona fide newscast exemption.
Therefore, under a straightforward reading of the statute, news-
112. Brigham, 276 F.2d at 830.
113. WMAY 40 F.C.C. at 433.
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caster candidates' opponents should not receive media time equivalent to
the amount of time the newscaster spends reporting the news. However,
to avoid possible abuses by newscaster candidates, the newscaster candi-
dates should be required to adhere to the guidelines recommended above.
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